The Lindley Lecture 2026-27: Sarah Stroud

“Interpersonal Morality”

Abstract:

A venerable line of thought within moral philosophy views personal relationships primarily as impediments to the equal consideration of all which moral thought embodies. I join with W. D. Ross in opposing that picture, maintaining instead that personal relationships are an important source of moral obligations. An examination of how they give rise to such obligations reveals a rich set of morally valenced act-types which are inherently interpersonal, in that they can be instantiated only within interpersonal relationships or interactions. I call the portion, or fragment, of morality to which these concepts belong interpersonal morality, and I suggest that it takes up more moral real estate than one might have thought. My ultimate aim, or hope, is to shift the center of gravity of moral concern toward the distinctive mode of thought which is proper to interpersonal contexts.

About the Speaker:

Sarah Stroud is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Parr Center for Ethics at the University of North Carlolina at Chapel Hill. She works across central areas of moral philosophy but is especially interested in foundational issues in moral theory and moral psychology and the intersection of such issues with metaethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of action. With colleague Daniel Muñoz, she co-authored Ethical Theory: 50 Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments (Routledge, 2024), and she is preparing the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Personal Relationships with co-editor Monika Betzler (LMU Munich). She previously co-edited Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (OUP, 2003) and the International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).